Making Sense of Congressional Intent: Statutory Interpretation and Welfare Policy by Katzmann, Robert A
Making Sense of Congressional Intent:
Statutory Interpretation and Welfare Policy
Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights. By R. Shep Melnick."
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994. Pp. viii, 344. $36.95
(hardcover) $16.95 (paper).
Robert A. Katzmannt
In the last decade, the study of statutory interpretation has taken on new
life. In part, the statutory work of the Supreme Court has assumed growing
importance because the legislation under review touches vital issues affecting
the nation. A court that pronounces what Congress meant in such areas as civil
rights,1 voting rights,' and gender discrimination 3 will almost certainly be the
object of heightened attention. Justice Antonin Scalia has fueled discussion
about statutory interpretation with his persistent criticism of the way courts use
legislative history, materials beyond the words of statutes." He has since been
joined by other Justices with interests in courts and legislation, including David
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer.5 Concern with how the
judiciary makes sense of legislation has reached Congress itself. Both the
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t Walsh Professor of American Government and Professor of Law. Georgetown University- President.
Governance Institute; and Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution.
I. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990): Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 490
U.S. 642 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy. 114 S. CL 2647 (1994); Holder v. Hall. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994);
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992); UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J.. dissenting); Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738-39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.. concurring in the judgment);
Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia. J.. concurring in the judgment), Robert A.
Katzmann, Summary of Proceedings, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TowARD INsTrmONAL COMmY 162.
171-75 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) [hereinafter JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS) (quoting Justice Scalia).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co.. 112 S. Ct. 2102. 2109 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J.)
("Justice Scalia upbraids us for reliance on legislative history, his St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory
construction.... The shrine, however, is well peopled (though it has room for one more) and its
congregation has included such noted elders as Mr. Justice Frankfurter .... .-); Ruth Bader Ginsburg &
Peter Huber, The Intercircuit Comnittee, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1417 (1987); Stephen Breyer. On the Uses
of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL L REv. 845 (1992).
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House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Administration of Justice6 and the Joint Committee on the
Organization of Congress7 have conducted hearings on legislative-judicial
relations. Statutory interpretation has sparked attention not only in scholarly
books' and journals,9 but even in the popular media."0
At issue is the integrity of the legislative and judicial processes. When
courts interpret legislation, as former Judge Abner Mikva has observed, they
become an integral component of the legislative process." If courts have
difficulty understanding the legislative process that they interpret or Congress
does not provide the courts with direction as to its meaning, then both
branches have a problem deserving consideration. Beyond that, how the First
and Third branches interact has implications beyond those branches; the nature
of that relationship affects the shape and development of policy. In that sense,
the concern is with how the judiciary and the legislature work, either
independently, together, or at cross-purposes, as they influence policymaking.
The interplay of Congress and the courts has vital ramifications for the
administrative state itself. 2 When the judiciary interprets a statute or
6. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings on Statutory Interpretation]. As Subcommittee Chairman
Robert Kastenmeier put it: "This is more than just an academic debate." Id. at 2. Judicial doctrines of
statutory interpretation "may have a profound effect on the way Congress should be drafting legislation."
Id.
7. See Interbranch Relations: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on the Organization of Congress, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 298 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings on Interbranch Relations].
8. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) [hereinafter
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION]; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRicKEY, LAW
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH
STATUTES (1982).
9. This rich literature is difficult to summarize succinctly. Important recent work includes Daniel A.
Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. LJ. 281 (1989); Charles 0. Jones, A
Way of Life and Law: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1994, 89 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 1 (1995); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political
Advantages, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 217 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 231; Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is
Not the Primary Official with Responsibility To Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative
History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989); Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45
VAND. L. REv. 529 (1992); Symposium, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary
Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1754 (1993).
10. James H. Andrews, Breyer Would Join Court's Swing Center, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 18,
1994, at 6; Linda Greenhouse, Portrait of a Pragmatist: Confirmation Hearing for Breyer Elicits His
Emphasis on Rulings' Lasting Effects, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1994, at Al, D22; Robert A. Katzmann, Justice
Breyer: A Rival for Scalia on the Hill's Intent, ROLL CALL, May 31, 1994, at 5.
11. Abner J. Mikva, Getting the Law To Be Less Common, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 982 (1989); Abner
J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PIr. L. REV. 627, 627-28 (1987).
12. See, e.g, MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION (1988); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 549 (1985); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
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mandates or restrains executive action, it perforce affects the administrative
process. A court's decisions can influence not only the balance of forces within
Congress, but also the relationships among agencies or competing factions
within the bureaucracy, and the capacity of the President to control the
executive branch. "Policymaking is dynamic and complex; it can be conceived
as a continuum of institutional processes [judicial, legislative, and
administrative], sometimes acting independently, but often interacting in subtle
and perhaps not always conscious ways to influence the behavior of other
processes."'
13
In his major book, Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights, R.
Shep Melnick deepens our understanding of the intricate relationship between
the judiciary and the Congress in policymaking. Through three rich case
studies-Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, and
education for the handicapped-he examines how the federal judiciary, by
interpreting statutes, has expanded eligibility, enlarged benefits, and moved
control from the states to the federal government. If much of the previous
literature on statutory interpretation has focused on how judges might better
interpret statutes, Melnick approaches the matter from the perspective of policy
outcomes-asking "[w]hat difference did it make that the courts adopted this
interpretation rather than competing ones?"' 5 His intention is to study both
issues of process and of policy. With regard to the former, his objective is to
examine how the courts affected the balance of power between the states and
the federal government, between the Congress and the President, and between
Congress as a whole and its committees; to explain why different institutional
patterns occur in different policy areas; and to assess Justice Scalia's claim that
heavy reliance on legislative history threatens to "convert[] a system of judicial
construction into a system of committee-staff prescription. "6
With respect to matters of policy, Melnick explores basic beliefs about the
welfare state, the responsibilities of the government to its poor, and the
obligations of citizens to provide for themselves as these beliefs are reflected
in court decisions interpreting the AFDC title of the Social Security Act, the
Food Stamp Act, and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA). He endeavors to determine the extent to which members of
Congress shared these views, and the degree to which the assumptions of
members of Congress and the judiciary changed over time.
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989); Peer H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE LJ. 984.
13. ROBERT A. KAITzMANN, INS'ITnTIONAL DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION Poucy FOR
THE DISABLED 9 (1986).
14. R. SHEP MELNIcK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGrrS (1994).
15. Id. at 20.
16. Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Part I of this Review describes the political, institutional, and legal
contexts that shape Melnick's analysis and summarizes his conclusions with
regard to the effect of the courts in shaping policy within the three areas he
examines. In Part II, I discuss the impact of Melnick's findings on two current
academic debates, the first over whether courts are capable of effecting social
change, and the second on the viability of competing theories of statutory
interpretation. If Between the Lines effectively illustrates that legislative history
and, all too frequently, statutory language provide little guidance to courts
trying to discern legislative meaning, Part III argues that this state of affairs
can be ameliorated. I describe a series of ongoing projects designed to
overcome some of the problems that Melnick identifies.
I. CONTEXT
A. Politics, Institutional Process, and Law
One of the many strengths of this book is that it grounds specific case
studies of statutory interpretation in the larger context of the political arena in
which legislation is conceived. Melnick rightly describes two important
developments that affected the judicial interpretation of statutes in his case
studies: the ever-expanding responsibilities of the federal government and the
fragmentation of power at the national level-between Congress and the
executive, and within the legislature itself as congressional authority became
increasingly decentralized and the integrative power of political parties
diminished.'7
These changes have affected the design of statutes in a variety of ways.
Legislation in recent decades has tended to combine both specificity and
ambiguity. Some statutes leave key terms undefined and in effect give to
others-federal, state, and local officials as well as judges-the responsibility
of adding flesh to the statutory skeleton. The EAHCA, for instance, mandates
that states provide every handicapped child with a "free appropriate public
education,"' 8 but does not spell out what that means. Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 declares that "no otherwise qualified handicapped
individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap .... be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."' 9 In the absence of clear definition as to the meaning of
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual," judges and officials charged with
17. MELNICK, supra note 14, at 28-31.
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
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implementing the law have for two decades borne most of the responsibility
for fashioning its scope.
20
At the same time, legislation and accompanying committee reports have
often become more detailed; with each reauthorization, the entitlement laws,
which are the subject of Melnick's book, have become more specific. The
House report on the 1977 amendments to the Food Stamp Act occupied 869
pages and "contained advice on such matters as how late intake offices should
be open and which court decisions had identified the proper method for
counting the income of migrant workers."2' Congressional "micromanage-
ment" reflected legislative distrust of the executive branch, extending to
deadlines, procedures, and performance standards.22 In addition, demands
placed on states increased, with a variety of regulatory controls-direct orders,
crosscutting requirements, crossover sanctions, and funding cutoffs. 23 Still
another feature of the political context was congressional facilitation of
litigation. Many acts directly authorized suits by private parties to enforce
regulatory requirements. Still others contained liberal standing requirements for
those contesting agency rules. 4
Melnick also writes that federal courts developed devices that enlarged
their role in interpreting the law of entitlement. One such method was the
decline of judicial deference to administrators' interpretation of statutes, an
approach that had special force until the Court's enunciation of the Chevron'
doctrine in 1984. Federal courts in the 1960's and 1970's, as Richard Stewart
has written, focused on fidelity to procedures to assure fair representation for
all affected parties, and then made use of the "hard look" doctrine to delve into
agencies' substantive determinations.' Second, courts augmented their powers
by interpreting statutes in ways that allowed them to curb the discretion of
state officials. Federal judges, Melnick claims, helped alter federal-state
relations by, in effect, turning "conditions attached to federal
grants-previously enforced only through the termination of federal aid-into
individual rights enforceable through court injunctions."27 A third mechanism
involved an increased reliance on legislative history and broad statements of
statutory purpose to expand benefits and ease eligibility restrictions. Judges,
according to Melnick, combed the legislative history to find support for their
20. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Doe v. New York
Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
21. MELNIcK, supra note 14, at 34.
22. Id. at 32.
23. Id at 33.
24. Id. at 34.
25. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
26. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L REv. 1669.
1670-71, 1679-80 (1975).
27. MELNICK, supra note 14, at 45.
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interpretations so that their decisions were perceived to reflect congressional
purposes. 8
Melnick argues that reliance on broad statements of statutory purpose
subtly shifts the burden of proof in favor of those who seek to expand federal
programs because such statements generally are grandiloquently worded,
emphasizing goals rather than costs.29 A most significant development with
regard to entitlement statutes, the author believes, was the shift from a judicial
presumption of administrative regularity to one that administrators must justify
deviations from the principle of "actual need., 30 The claim is that federal
judges would invalidate state rules and federal regulations, "not because they
transgressed clear statutory language, but because they failed to take into
account the actual need of potential beneficiaries."'"
These judicial doctrines had a temporal quality. By the late 1980's, each
device seemed to be losing force. With the Chevron decision in 1984, the
Supreme Court ruled that a reviewing tribunal "may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by
the administrator of an agency., 32 When a statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to a specific issue, the only question before the court is whether the
agency adopted a "permissible construction of the statute."33 In other words,
the Supreme Court made it easier for an administrator's interpretation to
prevail. Moreover, as a consequence of a variety of Supreme Court opinions,
judicial control over state regulations loosened. Fewer implied rights of action
were recognized.34 In addition, Justice Scalia's critique of legislative history
appears to have had some effect, with the Court resorting less to such materials
when reliance on the words of a statute seems to be dispositive.35
B. The Impact of Statutory Interpretation on Public Policy:
Interpreting Welfare Rights
The impact of the federal courts was most striking with regard to the
AFDC program. For more than thirty years-from the legislation's passage in
1935 until 1968-state governments had much discretion in their welfare
programs, constrained only by a relatively few rules contained in Title IV of
the Social Security Act. 36 Congress repeatedly failed during this period to
28. Id. at 251.
29. Id. at 54.
30. Id. at 54-59.
31. Id. at 45.
32. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 843 (footnote omitted).
34. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch, & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
35. See Hearings on Interbranch Relations, supra note 7, at 79-80 (statement of Judge Patricia M.
Wald).
36. See MELNICK, supra note 14, at 68-72.
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enact nationally uniform eligibility requirements and benefit levels. The
Supreme Court's influence was perhaps most dramatic between 1968 and 1972.
When interpreting Title IV of the Social Security Act, the high tribunal
expressly disapproved of a Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
policy that allowed states to "vary eligibility requirements from the federal
standards without express or clearly implied congressional authorization."37
Because the federal statute hardly addressed the eligibility standard, the Court's
interpretation raised questions about almost all of the AFDC rules in every
state.38 The federal courts, a Senate Finance Committee report stated,
used the very broadness of the Federal statute (intended to allow
States more latitude) against the States by saying sometimes that
anything the Congress did not expressly prohibit it must have intended
to require-and sometimes that what the Congress did not expressly
permit it must have intended not to permit.
39
The lower courts expanded the Supreme Court's reading of Title IV,
invalidating state rules in such matters as verification procedures, methods for
determining income, and penalties for failure to register for work programs or
to identify the fathers of children receiving benefits.40 In time, the Supreme
Court criticized the circuit courts for their alleged "departure from ordinary
principles of statutory interpretation."' As Melnick explains, by the mid-
1980's the Court routinely ordered the circuit courts to defer to state and
federal administrators.4 2
In interpreting the Food Stamp Act during the 1970's, the other federal
courts were much influenced by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, which viewed the legislation as "a shift from supplementing the diets
of low-income households to guaranteeing those households the opportunity
for an adequate diet."'43 Courts ruled that Congress meant to "assure that no
eligible family need go malnourished." As a means of securing this
statutory right to a "nutritionally adequate diet,"'45 the courts required the
Department of Agriculture to offer benefits to more households, expand
outreach efforts to poor families, and make certification procedures less
37. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598. 601 (1972).
38. MELNICK, supra note 14, at 91-92.
39. S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972).
40. See MELNICK, supra note 14, at 104-08.
41. Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580 (1975).
42. See, e.g., MELNICK, supra note 14, at 104-06.
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unwieldy and intrusive.46 Court rulings effectively prevented the Ford
Administration from unilaterally shrinking the food stamp program.47
Moreover, court decisions crucially influenced the lengthy congressional
negotiations resulting in the enactment of the food stamp amendments of 1977.
Food stamp advocates, who were leaning towards reaching a compromise with
the Ford Administration, decided after the court decision enjoining the Ford
Administration's rules that they could risk waiting for a new Congress and
perhaps a new Democratic President. Their gamble was worth taking.48
President Jimmy Carter signed new legislation in 197749 that was far more
expansive than the bill Congress almost sent to Gerald Ford a year before.
With respect to the EAHCA, two federal court decisions in the early
1970's, PARC50 and Mills,1 writes Melnick, provided the political catalyst
and the model for federal legislation. Those opinions required state and local
systems to provide a "free appropriate public education" to all disabled
children, and also created procedural safeguards to ensure these substantive
rights. These decisions raised costs substantially for some states, and as a
consequence school officials sought more federal financial assistance.52 For
their part, congressional supporters of those with disabilities believed that
states should have to show that they protected the substantive and procedural
rights of the disabled as a condition for securing federal funds.5 3 In the
aftermath of the passage of the EAHCA, litigation increased-although
sponsors had argued lawsuits would be reduced as a consequence of the bill's
passage.54 School systems were sued for failure to provide students with an
"appropriate education" or "related services." The Supreme Court, in its only
ruling on the "appropriate education" standard, endorsed a deferential approach
towards review.55 Then Justice Rehnquist wrote that the act is "by no means
an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational
policy for those of the school authorities which they review., 56 Nevertheless,
Melnick shows that many district and circuit court judges have interpreted the
statute to strike down the "individualized education programs" submitted by
school officials in favor of more costly plans that promise to provide increased
benefits to children with disabilities.
46. See MELNICK, supra note 14, at 208-13.
47. Id. at 217-21.
48. Id. at 221.
49. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913, 958 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2030 (1988)).
50. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
51. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.DC. 1972).
52. MELNICK, supra note 14, at 235-36.
53. Id. at 236.
54. Id. at 140.
55. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
56. Id. at 206.
57. See MELNICK, supra note 14, at 172-75.
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II. IMPLICATIONS
Melnick's rich case studies have important implications for scholars
interested in the role of courts in the policy process, and for those attempting
to set forth broad theories of statutory interpretation. The careful empirical
studies in Between the Lines provide support for some of the conclusions
drawn by scholars functioning at a greater level of abstraction, but also cast
doubt upon others.
A. The Courts, Statutory Interpretation, and Social Change
Between the Lines should be read as part of the ongoing debate, spurred
by Gerald N. Rosenberg's influential The Hollow Hope,53 about the role of
the judiciary in effecting social change. Rosenberg argues that courts are
"virtually powerless to produce change" 59 because of structural restraints that
are part of the judicial system. Even more strongly, he writes that "U.S. courts
can almost never be effective producers of significant social change."
Indeed, the "lure of litigation,"'M he claims, "siphons off crucial resources and
talent, and runs the risk of weakening political efforts." 62 By turning to an
"institution [the judiciary] that is constrained from helping them," institutional
reform litigation may hamper advances by "providing only an illusion of
change.
63
Melnick's work provides evidence for Peter Schuck's criticism that The
Hollow Hope "neglects the repetitive, dialogic nature of the interactions
between courts, legislatures, agencies, and other social processes, as well as the
political synergy that some litigation engenders." 6 Indeed, each of Melnick's
case studies undermines the limited view of judicial impact. Interest groups
initiating litigation did not rely exclusively on lawsuits, but used courts as one
element of a strategy to achieve their ends. Litigation was used to delay,
compel, and concentrate legislative and administrative activity. Thus, just as
food stamp supporters used litigation to frustrate action during the 94th
Congress, advocates for the disabled used district court rulings to spur
Congress to enact the EAHCA. In the AFDC, food stamps, and education of
58. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUr SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991).
59. Id. at 336.
60. Id. at 338.
61. Id. at 341.
62. Id. at 339.
63. Id. at 341.
64. Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE LJ. 1763. 1771-72 (1993)
(book review). Other recent works bearing on the role of courts and social change include Gene B.
Spering, Does the Supreme Court Matter, in THE AMERICAN PROSPECT READER IN AMERICAN POLITICS
378 (Walter Dean Burnham ed., 1995); Stephen L. Carter, Do Courts Matter?. 90 MICH. L. REV. 1216
(1992); Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL L. REV. 1027 (1992) (review essay).
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the handicapped programs, reformers used litigation as leverage to create
opportunities for activity in other political spheres. For instance, the Supreme
Court's early AFDC decisions allowed the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare to adopt a harder line with the states. The financial pressures
placed on state and local governments by the PARC s5 and Mills66 decisions
moved their officials to turn to Washington, D.C., for federal assistance;
advocates for the disabled then insisted that as a condition of receiving federal
money schools demonstrate their compliance with court rulings.
If Melnick convincingly shows the impact of the federal courts-in each
of the three programs examined the judiciary expanded their scope and shifted
power from the states to the federal government-he also demonstrates
conclusively the ways in which statutory decisions can affect policy and
process. A focus solely on constitutional law to the neglect of statutory cases
skews understanding of the role of the judiciary. Melnick supplies the missing
pieces.
B. Lessons for Theorists of Statutory Interpretation
Proponents of various conceptions of statutory interpretation will learn
much from Between the Lines, as the case studies demonstrate both the utility
and limits of several approaches.
1. Public Interest Theory
The complexities of legislation, illuminated in the book, raise questions
about the "public interest" approach advocated by Hart and Sacks,67 among
others.68 This approach, much like the Madisonian vision, assumes that the
legislative process and legislative decisions are deliberative, informed, and
efficient. According to this view, every statute and every doctrine of unwritten
law has some kind of purpose or objective. 69 Thus, a judge who seeks to
understand unclear wording first identifies the purpose and policy it embraces,
and then deduces the result most consonant with those goals.
To be sure, this perspective provides an important antidote to the
traditional canons of statutory construction. Its thrust is to try to understand the
meaning of statutes in their own context, with appropriate resort to the process
that produced the law, encompassing relevant legislative history. The flexible
65. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
66. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
67. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN TIlE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip R Frickey eds., 1994).
68. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1957); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM, L. REv. 527, 534-38 (1947).
69. HART & SACKS, supra note 67, at 143, 161-65.
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nature of the inquiry suggested by this approach means that judges could
extend the rationale of a statute to cover new circumstances, even those not
envisioned when the legislature enacted the law. Whatever its virtues, however,
this "public interest" perspective cannot by itself capture the complexities of
the legislative process. Not infrequently, legislation is a collection of
ambiguous and contradictory statements; this is a special problem with regard
to large omnibus bills and measures that are rushed through Congress at the
end of an exhausting session. For such statutes, it is something of a fiction to
presume that Congress had a clear statutory purpose or that a court can infer
with any certainty the legislative vision of the public interest.
The case studies of Between the Lines reflect this by depicting the "[miany
[flaces of Congress,"70 as Melnick aptly puts it. Some legislators supported
expansion of the food stamp program because it would increase money poor
families could spend on items besides food. Others voted for it because they
believed it would upgrade the nutrition of poor families. With regard to AFDC,
most legislators, Melnick believes, probably voted for the AFDC amendments
because they were part of a large social security measure.7' Some may have
voted for it because it provided new services to recipients; still others saw it
as a warning to the states to crack down on welfare. With respect to the
EAHCA, some supporters thought that it would add federal funds without
imposing extensive federal control over local school systems; others thought
it would offer disabled students a variety of new services; still others were of
the view that Congress should be responsive to judicial decisions establishing
rights of the disabled; and a few believed that Congress should move because
the Supreme Court might undo lower court decisions?2 The point, in short,
is that Congress consists of a wide variety of legislators, with differing views
of the public good, all of which are not simply captured by the "public
interest" conception.
2. Public Choice Theory
The findings of Between the Lines also pose challenges to the "public
choice" school, which uses principles of market economics to explain decision
making.73 Like many schools, its scholars are not all of one mind, and cannot
70. MELNICK, supra note 14, at 256. On this point. see Kenneth A. Shepsle. Congress Is a -They, "
Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECoN. 239 (1992) (arguing notion of
single legislative intent is misguided given multiplicity of legislators).
71. MELNICK. supra note 14, at 259.
72. Id.
73. For a discussion of the subject, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHIUP P. FRICKEY. LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK. THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger. Economic Models of Interest
Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL Sc1. 512 (1991); Susan Rose-Ackenman. Progressive Law
and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE LJ. 341 (1988).
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be simply characterized. 74 Generally though, its proponents depict the
legislative process as driven by rational, egoistic, utility-maximizing legislators
whose primary motivation is to be returned to office. On this view, legislators
will pass laws that tend to transfer wealth and reduce efficiency, at the expense
of society, to cohesive special interest groups that lobby the legislature. Laws
benefiting the public will be scarce because of the "collective action" problem.
That is, "rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their
common or group interests ' '7' because the benefits being sought are collective
to the group as a whole; hence the rational individual has an incentive to be
a free rider. It is thus by no means automatic that interest groups will arise to
press legislators to enact "public interest" legislation.
Sharply different from the "public interest" conception, this vision of the
legislature is grim. Legislators, eager to be reelected, avoid choices on critical
issues that could antagonize energized groups. They do not work to develop
coherent policy, but instead seek to accommodate the preferences of interest
groups through ad hoc bargaining. Evading their responsibility, legislators
adopt vague statutes vesting policymaking duties in administrators who must
stumble through a mine field of unresolved problems.
Public choice theory encourages us to think about how self-interest affects
decision making, to evaluate the impact of incentives on behavior, and to
explore why collective action is often difficult to undertake.76 But the theory
hardly explains the universe of the legislative process. 7 The motivations of
legislators are complex and cannot be reduced to simple formulae. The view
that legislators simply respond to interest groups, that their behavior, votes, and
agenda are dictated by those interest groups, and that they simply transfer
wealth to those groups in return for campaign support is askew. As studies
have shown, Congress can respond without much interest group support,7 8
often despite powerful and intense interest group opposition.79 To be sure,
74. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract
Clause, 51 U. CHL L. REV. 703 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77
CAL. L. REv. 83 (1989).
75. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1965) (emphasis omitted).
76. James Q. Wilson, Interests and Deliberation in the American Republic, or Why James Madison
Would Never Have Received the James Madison Award, 13 PS: POL SCI. & POL. 558-62 (1990).
77. An earlier theory of interest group politics, the pluralist conception, suggests more favorably that
legislative outcomes reflect the competition and equilibrium of competing interest groups, which foster both
stability and orderly change. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVFRNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN
AN AMERICAN CITY (1961); DAVID TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951).
78. MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 13 (1985) (noting that
deregulation occurred without support of organized interests); KATzMANN, supra note 13, at 189 (noting
that section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enacted without interest group impetus).
79. On the role of interest groups generally, see, for example, PHILIP A. MUNDO, INTEREST GROUPS:
CASES AND CHARACTERISTICS (1992); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, OROANIZED
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986).
2356 [Vol. 104: 2345
Statutory Interpretation and Welfare Policy
legislators are responsive to the need to be reelected. 8W But they are also
affected by a desire to affect policy in ways that they think are in the public
interest. 8I The better view, as James Q. Wilson has written, may be that
legislation can have a wide variety of political causes, and that if we are to
understand outcomes, then we need to specify the circumstances under which
one or another cause will be operative.82
All this is confirmed in Melnick's account. 83 Traditional interest groups
hardly played a role in the passage of the legislation that is the focus of
Melnick's study. Business groups had almost no influence. Farm groups
provided little support to the food stamp program. The Chamber of Commerce,
which sought to cut food stamps in the mid-1970's, did not prevail. Those
groups that were successful-for example, the National Association for
Retarded Citizens, the Council for Exceptional Children, the intergovernmental
lobby, and the "hunger lobby"-had neither wholly economic nor very well-
defined interests. Melnick describes how many of the legislators in these cases
were motivated by deeply held convictions about the public interest, rather
than a desire to do what best suited their electoral interests or to keep their
power in Congress.' Russell Long and Thomas Foley played leading roles
in the AFDC and food stamp cases, respectively, because of their conceptions
of what constituted good public policy." The debate in all three case studies
illustrated that politics is messy, with outcomes seldom free of ambiguity. Such
is the consequence of a pluralistic system in which values compete.
3. Positive Political Theory
Positive political theorists will also benefit from the stories Melnick
provides. These analysts have attempted to explain why Congress often finds
it difficult to overturn court decisions even when the rulings at issue
contravene an agreement of the winning and still-present legislative
coalition.86 Through his examination of the food stamp program, Melnick
offers a cogent explanation. If one part of the original coalition favors the
court's decision over the legislative agreement, and if the remaining members
of the coalition cannot gather sufficient support to replace the lost votes, then
the judicial ruling will stand. 87 Thus, before the Trurmp8 decision, food
80. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESs: THE ELECTORAL CONNEcTION 13 (1974).
81. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, Introduction to THE POWER OF PUBIUC IDEAS 3 (Robert B. Reich ed..
1990).
82. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLMCS OF REGUiAnoN 357. 364-72
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
83. See MELNICK, supra note 14, at 260.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins et al.. Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies. 75 VA. L. RE'. 431. 445 (1989).
87. MELNICK, supra note 14, at 261.
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stamp advocates felt that they had to reach an accommodation with President
Ford; after the ruling, they were more willing to wait for a new President and
Congress.89
Attempting to explain the reasons for legislative success in overturning
court rulings in the case studies, Melnick offers two theories: First,
strategically placed committee leaders had the power to protect court decisions
they favor and to move along legislation modifying decisions they sought to
change;9° and second, most overrides were lodged in larger financing bills
that provided a measure of convenient protection from scrutiny.9'
Nevertheless, in spite of the obstacles to legislative action that rational
choice theorists have noted,92 Melnick's case studies show that Congress does
in fact modify or reverse judicial rulings. The 1977 food stamp amendments
changed a number of court rulings on benefits and eligibility.93 Congress
overturned the Supreme Court's decision on attorneys' fees through enactment
of the Handicapped Children Protection Act.94 It also reversed a Supreme
Court ruling limiting parents' rights to collect damages from the states.95
Between 1981 and 1984, Congress upset a number of AFDC decisions.96 The
findings of these case studies are consistent with the work of William N.
Eskridge, Jr., who has provided data indicating that since 1975 Congress
reversed or modified at least 300 lower court and 100 Supreme Court
rulings. 97
Positive political theorists interested in how legislators structure the rules
of the "game"98 that will later be played as agencies and courts attempt to
make sense of a newly passed statute will also find Between the Lines an
important empirical source. How legislators write the laws can be powerful
signals of legislative meaning to courts and agencies.99 A detailed statute may
88. Trump v. Butz, No. 76-933 (D.D.C. June 18, 1976).
89. MELNICK, supra note 14, at 217.
90. Id. at 263.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 261 (describing "multiple veto points in the legislative process").
93. Id. at 221.
94. Id. at 175-76.
95. Id. at 176.
96. Id. at 104.
97. william N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE
LJ. 331 (1991).
98. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613 (1991); see also KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND
LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991); John A. Ferejohn & Charles R. Shipan, Congressional Influence on
Administrative Agencies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 393
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 4th ed. 1989); John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan,
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 1 (1990); John Ferejohn & Barry
Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEo. LJ. 565 (1992); Matthew D.
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 243 (1987); Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 51 (1994).
99. See Robert A. Katzmann, The American Legislative Process as a Signal, 9 J. PUB. POL'Y 287, 292
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be the clearest way to communicate to the other branches; but at times in the
effort to reach an agreement members of Congress will pass vague statutes,
deliberately leaving such controversies to be resolved by administrators and
judges. Congress has a variety of mechanisms to affect administrators and
judges. It can determine the powers of administrative agencies, the standards
for exhaustion of administrative remedies, the scope and availability of judicial
review, the limits of standing to sue, where suits must be filed, what remedies
to allow, and the availability of attorneys' fees.
Melnick demonstrates that although legislation is often crafted without
much thought to these issues, at times Congress actively pays attention to at
least some of them."° Thus, negotiations leading to passage of the EAHCA
involved considerable discussion about judicial review of school decisions,
with advocates of the disabled supporting a more stringent standard than state
and local systems.' °' To the extent that strategic calculations of this sort are
made about how to structure judicial review, members of Congress are likely
to be influenced by factors such as their perceptions of administrative and
judicial competence, their ability to exercise post hoc control (greater with
respect to administrators than judges), and the degree to which judicial review
is sought by an important element of the coalition needed to secure passage of
the final legislation.'0 2 Melnick also suggests that members of Congress are
likely to encourage judicial review when "they favor program expansion and
bear little responsibility for footing the bill.' 0 3 That explanation has a
temporal quality, and depends upon the existence of a judiciary that supports
such expansion-not necessarily so, as judges appointed in the 1980's would
probably attest.
4. Textualist Theory
Textualists' °4 reading Between the Lines will find some support for their
claim that legislative history is unreliable, that citing it, in the words of Judge
Harold Leventhal, is like "looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends."'05 But those textualists who believe that committee reports are
invariably successful devices by which committee members and staff promote
their policy preferences may be forced to reassess their assumptions upon
review of Melnick's case studies. In neither the food stamp program nor
(1990).
100. MELNICK, supra note 14, at 269-70.
101. Id. at 270.
102. Id at 272-73.
103. lId at 272.
104. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, I I FIARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); Kenneth W. Start. Observations About the Use of Legislatve History. 1987
DUKE L.J. 371; sources cited supra note 4.
105. See MELNICK, supra note 14. at 251 (quoting Judge Leventhal).
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AFDC was the legislative history relied upon by the court manufactured or
manipulated by the members or staff of committees with legislative jurisdiction
over the programs."°6 In fact, at times committee chairs felt frustrated that
the courts had either ignored or failed to interpret correctly key aspects of the
legislative history. 7 Assessing the role of legislative history generally in the
case studies, Melnick concludes that references to it were "little more than
window dressing designed to provide additional support for positions arrived
at by other means."'08 Of greater significance in his view than the use of
legislative history to the courts' interpretation of statutes were the assumptions
judges made about separation of powers, federalism, and the nature of
individual rights.'09
III. CONGRESS AND THE CouRTs: CLARIFYING LEGISLATIVE MEANING
Legislative history might very well have played a more important role in
judicial interpretation if Congress had developed more reliable signals to the
courts as to its use. The more authoritative Congress is as to the appropriate
use of such material, the more likely that legislative history will have the
intended weight. Legislative history, in my view, is a necessary component of
judicial inquiry, especially when a statute's meaning is not clear on its face
and a court needs guidance." 0 As Justice Breyer has written, the problem
lies not in its use, but its abuse."' Thus, it is imperative that Congress
develop means to clarify the use of such materials if courts are to better
interpret legislative meaning.
Discerning legislative meaning is often a difficult task. Consider the
following typical pattern. Congress enacts a law and the statute becomes the
object of litigation. The court must then interpret the meaning of the words of
the statute. Yet the language is often unclear. As the judiciary looks for
guidance, it delves into the legislative history-the foundation on which most
judges seek to interpret statutory meaning. In so doing, the court must
106. Id. at 252.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 253.
109. Id. at 238-51.
110. My views on this subject are further developed in my forthcoming book, COURTS AND
CONGRESS: REFLECIIONS FROM THE FIELD (forthcoming Nov. 1995). On this point, see, for example,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 225-38; Breyer, supra note 5; George A. Costello,
Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports,
Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE LJ. 39; Michael Livingston,
Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEim
L. REv. 819 (1991); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE LJ. 380; Stephen
F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399; Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The
"New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDoZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).
111. Breyer, supra note 5, at 874.
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determine in the first instance what constitutes legislative history and how to
weigh its various parts: including committee reports, conference committee
reports, floor debates, and votes. The court may have to penetrate layer upon
layer of rules and procedures. At times, the legislative history is virtually
nonexistent. In other situations, it is ambiguous. In particular cases, Congress
deliberately does not deal with difficult issues. In other circumstances, the
legislature might have chosen to avoid gaps and ambiguities had it been aware
of the problem. When Congress has not addressed an issue the court may be
asked to fill in gaps not only in the statutory language, but also in the statute
itself. For example, Congress may not have addressed questions of preemption,
attorneys' fees, civil statutes of limitations, constitutional severability
provisions, private rights of action, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and
the nature of the administrative proceedings.
Congressional organization and process-early targets for the House
leadership of the 104th Congress-also contributed to the difficulty of
discerning legislative intent in Melnick's case studies. In some ways,
fragmentation increased, staffs grew substantially, subcommittees proliferated,
and the opportunities for legislative entrepreneurship, in ways unobserved by
the whole chamber, expanded as well." 2
What this all means is that when Congress does not give explicit direction
about its legislative meaning, it not only creates added burdens for the courts:
It also increases the risk that the judiciary, in a good faith effort to make sense
of the problems before it, will interpret statutes in ways that the legislature did
not intend. It is, of course, too much to expect that institutions will act with
perfect knowledge. Given the political and policy complexities surrounding
many issues, it is unrealistic to believe that those institutions can definitively
address all the problems they face. Indeed, sometimes legislation is purposely
ambiguous, and legislative history will not provide the key to unlock
congressional meaning. But often Congress could be clearer as to its meaning
if only attention were paid, and legislative history could be a valuable tool if
only its indicators were more reliable.
To be sure, what the role of the judiciary in reviewing legislation should
be is in no small measure dependent upon subjective perspectives about the
proper allocation of responsibilities among courts, Congress, and various parts
of the administrative branch-about what tasks we think each institutional
process should assume. Such perspectives are based upon assumptions about
how Congress functions, the factors affecting legislative outcomes, and the
ability of the judiciary to make sense of congressional intent. Any of these
conceptions should to one degree or another share this objective-based upon
112. As an empirical matter, it will be interesting to observe whether a tightening of congressional
organization and reduction in staff, as promised by the new congressional leadership, will affect the
capacity of Congress to develop legislative history that is more authoritative.
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an empirical examination of the way Congress works, to ascertain how courts
can better interpret statutory meaning and to determine whether and how
Congress can clarify legislative history. Theories about how courts should
interpret legislative history can be advanced with greater confidence to the
extent that they are informed by an appreciation of the complex reality of the
legislative process.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then at bottom ways should be found
for courts to better understand the legislative process and legislative history
and for Congress to more clearly signal its intent. Time could be spent
pondering what can be done in the long term about the legislative
fragmentation, the conflicts among committees, the difficulties in making trade-
offs, and the problems of deliberation in Congress-all of which contribute to
the courts' difficulties in understanding the legislative process.'2 3 But there
are more immediate steps that could be taken. In the short term, Congress can
clarify legislative meaning in three ways: through more precise drafting, more
authoritative legislative histories, and refinement of the revision process." 4
A. Drafting
Greater attention to legislative drafting would make it more likely that
congressional intent will be understood and respected. If Congress is concerned
that judicial doctrines have vested executive agencies with too much power to
interpret statutes, then legislators can strive to write bills with greater
113. For an excellent analysis, see THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, RENEWING CONGRESS:
A SECOND REPORT 84-86 (1993).
114. In discussing each of these approaches, I draw upon ongoing work of the Governance Institute,
undertaken with the support of the Brookings Institution. Founded in 1986, the Governance Institute is a
nonprofit organization concerned with exploring, explaining, and easing problems associated with both the
separation and the division of powers in the American federal system. The Institute's focus is on
institutional process, a nexus linking law, institutions, and policy. It has three program areas: problems of
the judiciary; problems of the administrative state; and challenges to the legal profession. Working with
decision makers in the federal judiciary and the Congress, the Institute's project on judicial-congressional
relations has three principal parts: (1) examining the kinds of ground rules, protocols, and factors to be
considered for different types of communications between the branches; (2) exploring how courts can better
understand the legislative process and legislative history, how Congress can better signal its intent in
statutes, and how the judiciary can make the legislature more aware of its decisions interpreting statutes;
and (3) assessing the institutional processes and mechanisms that might improve relations between the
branches.
Among the products of the Governance Institute project on judicial-legislative relations are: Hearings
on Interbranch Relations, supra note 7, at 298-312, 276-78 (statements of Robert A. Katzmann and Robert
W. Kastenmeier); Hearings on Statutory Interpretation, supra note 6, at 128 (statement of Robert A.
Katzmann); JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS, supra note 4; Frank M. Coffin, Communication Among the Three
Branches: Can the Bar Serve as Catalyst?, 75 JUDICATURE 125 (1991); Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the
Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653
(1992) [hereinafter Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gull]; Robert A. Katzmann, Building Bridges: Courts,
Congress, and Guidelines for Communications, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1991, at 42 [hereinafter
Katzmann, Building Bridges]; Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, Project Seeks To Improve
Communications Between Courts and Legislatures, 75 JUDICATURE 45 (1991).
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precision." 5 They may attempt in legislation itself to define the degree of
deference that should be granted to executive agencies in interpreting statutes.
Although court cases are likely to arise over whether such efforts would usurp
the executive and judicial functions, I am not without hope that carefully
drafted provisions in legislation about questions of deference could prevail.
With respect to drafting, it would be useful to determine if some way
could be found to subject such activity to centralized scrutiny applying
accepted standards. The House of Representatives and the Senate have offices
of legislative counsel, trained in the nuances of drafting. A checklist't 6 of
common problems could be prepared for the benefit of those in Congress who
do not use the professional drafting services. Such a checklist would focus
legislators' attention on such matters as constitutional severability, civil statutes
of limitations, attorneys' fees, private rights of action, preemption, and
exhaustion of administrative remedies. These issues, when they are not
explicitly addressed in the legislation itself, are often left to the courts for
resolution. Establishing a means to focus legislative attention on these issues
could reduce judicial burdens and give clearer direction as to legislative intent.
To improve drafting, periodic seminars involving legislative counsel and judges
would be useful. The Governance Institute, a nonprofit organization with
which I am involved, is engaging in efforts to promote such activity."'
7
B. Legislative History
Authoritative legislative histories should be completed prior to final
passage. Legislative signals of intent could be made clearer, particularly if the
most important and agreed-upon background and purposes of the legislation
can be more sharply identified.
Consider the significance to be attached to committee reports. Assuming
they are to be given weight as courts seek to understand statutory meaning,
attention should be paid to devices that make it more likely that committee
reports receive positive congressional assent. There are ways to distinguish
between those parts of committee reports that receive such affirmative approval
and those that do not. At the very least, as Professor Stephen Ross has noted,
115. At least part of the difficulty of achieving clarity comes from the porous nature of the
congressional process in which bills and amendments can be introduced without review by the professional
drafters. In Britain, where party loyalty and executive-dominated government charartenze the parliamentary
system, highly trained civil servants write the laws with greater precision. See Patrick S. Auyah. Judicial-
Legislative Relations in England, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS, supra note 4. at 129, 155-61
116. On checklists, see, for example, Robert A. Katzmann. The Continuing Challenge. in JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS, supra note 4, at 180, 183-84; see also FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL COM. ON TilE SECOND
CIRcUIrr COURTS, A REPoRr ON JUDICIAL IMPACT LEGISLATION (Dec. 15, 1989); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF TiE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM.ITTEE 91
(1990).
117. For further discussion of the Governance Institute's activities, see supra note 114.
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it would be desirable if committee members signed committee reports."t ' At
present, only the chair and those presenting additional views sign the reports,
leading to charges that they may lack majority support. Having committee
members sign the report would blunt at least that part of the critique of
legislative history which holds that not even legislators assigned to committees
are cognizant of committee reports.
As legislation nears passage, the floor managers of legislation should strive
to reach some agreement as to what constitutes authoritative legislative history.
Thus, they would reach some shared understanding as to which floor
statements and colloquies should be given weight and indicate that such
material by express arrangement is meant to be part of the authoritative
legislative history." 9 Such a procedure might make it easier for judges to
interpret the Congressional Record-a document that can be easily
manipulated, and that is in many instances a source of hopeless confusion.
Congressional concern with making legislative history more authoritative
will also aid courts as they weigh the amicus briefs of legislators seeking to
influence the judiciary's view about legislative intent. At times, legislators who
have failed to secure their objectives in the congressional arena try to secure
their ends through the judiciary. To the extent that legislative materials become
more authoritative, courts will be better able to evaluate amicus briefs and
ascertain congressional meaning.
C. Statutory Revision
As Congress revises statutes, it might draw upon the experience of courts
charged with interpreting its laws. For example, when a committee of Congress
is considering revising a complex piece of legislation, it might be useful for
judges experienced in interpreting statutes to testify as to the technical
difficulties in discerning congressional meaning. Although the courts and
Congress affect each other in many ways, uncertainty about the propriety of
various kinds of communications inhibits useful input. 20 Accordingly, the
118. Stephen Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes
to You?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 561, 575 (1992).
119. I recognize, of course, that even such agreements may be subject to differing interpretations. A
case in point is the discussion about the meaning of what constitutes the terms of the "exclusive legislative
history" of the provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H9526-32 (daily ed.
Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at H9533-35 (statement of Rep. Ford); id. at H9542-49
(statement of Rep. Hyde); 137 CONG. REC. S 15,952-53 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole);
147 CONG. REC. S15,472-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole); 137 CONG. REC.
S15,315-24 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at S15,325 (statement of Sen.
Danforth); 137 CONG. REC. S15,233-35 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
120. See Frank M. Coffin, The Federalist Number 86: On Relations Between the Judiciary and
Congress, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS, supra note 4, at 21; Katzmann, Building Bridges, supra note 114,
at 42. As chair of the Subcommittee on Courts, then Congressman Robert Kastenmeier would from time
to time draw upon such expertise. But generally, Congress does not avail itself of this opportunity, largely
because of the uncertainty of judges and legislators about such communication. See, e.g., Fair Use and
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development and refinement of communications protocols between judges and
legislators with regard to statutory revision would be helpful.1
2
'
Moreover, Congress would benefit from the states' experiences with law
revision commissions that provide for the orderly evaluation of statutes by
bringing together representatives of all three branches.'t- It would also be
worthwhile to develop mechanisms to facilitate the congressional resolution of
conflicts among the circuits with respect to legislative meaning, as Justice
Stevens"2 and Judge Wilfred Feinberg" have recommended. Then Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her coauthor Peter Huber advanced the idea that a
"second look at laws" committee be formed, and that the Office of Law
Revision Counsel assist in "statutory reexamination and repair."'2' Judge
Frank M. Coffin suggested that an entity within the judiciary gather and sift
judicial opinions with suggestions for the legislative branch and send them to
the Hill,126 a view endorsed more recently by Judge James L. Oakes of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." 7
A practical component of this effort to make the process of statutory
revision more rational is a pilot project, which the Governance Institute began
at the invitation of the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
CircuitYlu In that work, we helped design a system of collecting, sorting, and
circulating statutory opinions of the D.C. Circuit to relevant congressional
committees for legislative consideration.
In the effort to help close the gap between those who produce legislative
history and those who digest it, Judge Coffin and I conducted a study to
determine how judicial decisions identifying problems in legislation are
examined by Congress. 29 We found that in most cases, except for major
Unpublished Works: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomnn. on Patents, Copyrights. and Trademarks of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Propert); and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 101st Cong., 2d Ses. 81-143 (1990) (testimony of Judge
James L. Oakes, Judge Roger J. Miner, and Judge Piere N. Leval).
121. Katzmann, Building Bridges, supra note 114, at 42-43.
122. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 63-64 (1982); Hans A. Linde,
Observations of a State Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS. supra note 4. at 121. 127; Shirley S.
Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory
Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1070-72 (1991).
123. See John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177. 183 (1982).
124. See Wilfred Feinberg, Foreword: A National Court of Appeals?. 42 BROOK. L REv. 611. 627
(1976).
125. Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 5. at 1432.
126. Interview with Chief Judge Frank M. Coffin, THIRD BRANCH. June 1982. at 1. 6.
127. James L. Oakes, Grace Notes on "Grace Under Pressure". 50 OHIO ST. Li. 701.714-15 (1989).
128. The Governance Institute's project was encouraged by the special interest of then Chief Judge
Patricia M. Wald, Judge James L. Buckley, then Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg. and former Judge Abner J.
Mikva.
129. We selected 15 cases, suggested by the judges of the D.C. Circuit. Some problems involved
questions of grammar, such as misplaced commas and ambiguous adjectives. Other laws had technical gaps.
such as failing to state which courts had jurisdiction over cases that could be brought under the statutes.
In still other cases, the courts explicitly invited congressional action to clear up ambiguities. See
Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit. Panel 11-Congress and the
Judiciary: An Inquiry into Problems of Statutory Construction and Revision. 24 F.R-D. 312, 318-21 (1988);
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ones or those in which a losing party seeks legislative relief, congressional
staffs are generally unaware of circuit court rulings. Having determined that
staffs wanted to be informed of relevant opinions, the Governance Institute, in
close collaboration with then Chief Judge Mikva, proceeded to work out an
arrangement with the House of Representatives and the Senate whereby offices
in each chamber would receive the opinions and transmit them to the relevant
committees. 30  Other circuits-the First, Third, Seventh, and Tenth-have
joined this initiative, with others expected to become a part as well. In its
report to the Judicial Conference, the Committee on Long Range Planning
recommended that "[a]ll courts of appeal should be encouraged to participate
in the pilot project."' 3' Recently, the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress endorsed our enterprise.
1 32
Both branches benefit from this project. Congress will have an enhanced
appreciation for the judiciary's work, and the courts' workload may be
somewhat reduced if Congress improves drafting or resolves problems in
statutes identified by the judiciary. In addition, as the Governance Institute
monitors congressional reaction to court decisions, we will have a better sense
of congressional views about judicial interpretation of statutes. As the
Governance Institute analyzes the data from both the judiciary and Congress,
and holds seminars involving all those who work with statutes, the objective
is to upgrade the drafting, interpretation, and revision of statutes-a purpose
shared by the Legislative Counsels of both the House and Senate.
33
Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf, supra note 114, at 656-58.
130. Governance Institute Distinguished Fellow Robert W. Kastenmeier and I did so after many
discussions on the Hill, especially with the Legislative Counsel of the House, the Legislative Counsel of
the Senate, and the Legal Counsel of the Senate. The bipartisan leadership of each branch-then Speaker
Thomas Foley, then House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt, then House Minority Leader Robert Michel,
then Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, then Senate Pro Tempore Robert Byrd, and then Senate
Minority Leader Robert Dole-launched the experiment in 1992.
In their memorandum of May 21, 1992, Foley, Gephardt, and Michel indicate that they "believe that
the program would be most useful if it were applied to all circuits." Hearings on Interbranch Relations,
supra note 7, at 309 (reprinting Letter of Foley, Gephardt, and Michel to Legislative Counsel David
Meade). Senators Mitchell, Byrd, and Dole state that "[tihis project offers great promise as a thoughtful
and productive step in improving communications between the judiciary and the Congress to the benefit
of both branches." Id. at 310 (reprinting Letter of Mitchell, Byrd, and Dole to Legislative Counsel Francis
Burk). They note that the "hope is that the identification and transmittal of such opinions to the appropriate
congressional committees will furnish information helpful to Congress's efforts to improve its
communication of legislative intent in statutory drafting." Id. For his part, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, in the 1992 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, pointed to the Governance Institute
project as an effort to improve relations between the branches by making "it easier for judges to alert
legislators to statutory drafting problems identified in the course of adjudication." William H. Rehnquist.
Chief Justice Issues 1992 Year-End Report, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1993, at 1, 4.
131. COMMrrTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOsED LONG
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 119 (2d prtg. 1995) (recommendation 99e).
132. JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS, FINAL REPORT, H. REP. No. 413, vol.
I1, S. REP. NO. 215, vol. 11, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1993).
133. Letter from Francis L. Burk, Jr., Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate, to Professor Robert Katzmann
(Nov. 29, 1994) (on file with author); Letter from David E. Meade, Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Robert W. Kastenmeier (Dec. 8, 1994) (on file with author).
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IV. CONCLUSION
"To students of statutory interpretation," writes Professor Melnick, "no
problem is more vexing than affixing a single meaning or intent to legislation
that is the product of many hands.""' But Congress is not without means to
help facilitate understanding of its legislative product.
In Between the Lines, Shep Melnick challenges us to better understand the
effects of judicial interpretation of statutes on policy and process. He does so
with an impressive analysis that places his subject within the context of the
division of power and responsibility among all three branches of government,
while at the same time showing mastery of three dimensions of welfare policy.
In so doing, Melnick stimulates us to appreciate not only how policy and
process intersect, but how institutions can be made to work better. For all
those insights, students of law, politics, and policy are much in his debt.
134. MELNICK, supra note 14, at 256.
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